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There are 29 automotive firms in the world’s largest 500 firms. Yet none of these are 
“global” firms, defined as having at least 20 per cent of their sales in each of the three 
regions of the broad “triad” of the E.U., North America and Asia. Indeed 23 of the 29 
auto and auto parts firms are home-region based, with an average of 60.6 per cent of their 
sales as intra-regional. These are representative firms across the 500, as the average intra-
regional sales for all manufacturing firms is 61.8 per cent. These are a few special cases, 
especially Toyota and Nissan of firms being active in two regions of the triad. 
DaimlerChrysler and Honda are “host-region oriented”. Seven cases are discussed in 
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Introduction 
 
In a previous article in this journal, it has been demonstrated that globalization is a myth, 
Rugman and Hodgetts (2001). Business leaders cannot simply assume that world markets 
are fully integrated and that consumer demand is becoming homogenized. Nor is there a 
trend towards global economic integration. Instead, the data indicate that world markets 
are divided into three large “triad” blocks. The great majority of world trade, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and sales by large firms takes place within these triad blocks, 
rather than between them. Further, there is evidence that such intra-regional trade, FDI 
and corporate sales are all increasing. The growth of these regional blocks should not be 
mistaken for globalization as entry to other regions of the triad is a difficult journey for 
most firms. Indeed, in another article in this journal, it was shown that only one of the 49 
retail firms in the world’s 500 largest firms was global (LVMH) whereas most were 
heavily dependent for sales on their home region, Rugman and Girod (2003). The world’s 
largest firm, Wal-Mart, has 94 per cent of its sales in North America, while Carrefour has 
81.3 per cent in Europe and Itochu has 100 per cent in Asia. 
  Recently the latter work has been extended to investigate the global or regional 
activities of the entire set of the world’s 500 largest firms. These firms account for 90 per 
cent of the world’s stock of FDI and nearly half the world’s trade, Rugman (2000). From 
this work it has been demonstrated that the vast majority of international business activity 
by the 500 firms is conducted on a regional basis, rather than globally, Rugman and Brain 
(2003), Rugman and Verbeke (2004), Rugman (2004). The large regional “triad” markets 
of the European Union (EU), the United States (or, more broadly, NAFTA) and Japan 
(or, more broadly, all of Asia) also account for most of the sales of the world’s largest 
automobile companies. For 380 of the world’s 500 largest companies, data on their   3
geographic sales in the “broad” triad regions of Europe, North America and Asia 
(including Oceania) is available. Of these 380, 180 are manufacturing MNEs, see Table 
1. The motor vehicle and parts industry accounts for 29 of these manufacturing MNEs.  
Table 1 here 
 
  In this paper, we focus on the regional sales and localized production of the 29 
large auto firms. We develop a table with the regional sales of these 29 firms. We find 
that none are global, only four are bi-regional, and the vast majority are home-region 
oriented. We then examine the reasons for such home-region sales including some 
discussion of the localized production clustering of auto and auto parts makers within 
each of the regions of the triad. We discuss the possible barriers to global expansion in 
this sector. Finally, we report in detail on the regional strategies and organizational 
structures of five leading auto firms. We find that the auto industry is not global, but very 
regional in its activities. 
 
A Regional Automotive Industry 
In previous papers, a revenue-based classification for firms’ regional scope was 
developed, Rugman and Brain (2003), Rugman and Verbeke (2004). Global firms were 
defined as deriving over 20 per cent of their sales from each region of the broad triad, but 
less than 50 per cent in any one region. Bi-regional firms were defined as deriving over 
20 per cent of their sales from two regions of the triad, including their own, but less than 
50 per cent in the region in which they are headquartered. Host-region firms are defined 
as deriving over 50 per cent of their sales from a region other than their own. Home-
region oriented firms, derived over 50 per cent of their sales from the region in which 
they are headquartered.    4
 
If we begin by examining the ‘Transnationality Index’ (TNI) published in the 
World Investment Report (UNCTAD) (2003) we find that all but two auto firms (Honda 
and Volvo) are actually less transnational than the average (59.4 per cent) for the top 100 
non-financial transnational corporations (Table 2). This widely-cited measure of 
transnationality is based on comparing the foreign to total (F/T) ratios of three measures: 
sales, employment and assets. So it focuses on the country-level (F/T) dependence of a 
firm. 
Table 2 here 
 
If we then examine the regional dependence of these firms we find, as shown in 
Table 3, that none of the 29 automotive MNEs in the largest 500 are global; in fact, 23 
are classified as “home-region oriented”, with a majority of their sales in their home 
region of the triad. This includes Volvo which, despite its high TNI indicating a lack of 
home country orientation, is heavily dependent on the European region. Two automakers 
and two parts makers are bi-regional, with over 20 per cent of their sales in two parts of 
the triad and less than 50 per cent in any region.  
DaimlerChrysler and Honda derive more than 50 per cent of their revenue from a 
host region and are labeled “host-region oriented.”   The weighted average of intra-
regional sales in the automotive sector is 60.6 per cent, just below the manufacturing 
sector’s average of 61.8 per cent.  
Table 3 here 
The automotive sector is concentrated in the three triad regions of the United 
States (North America), Europe and Japan (Asia). In each of these regions, domestic   5
producers are significantly more competitive than foreign producers. General Motors, 
Ford and the Chrysler Group of DaimlerChrysler (a U.S. company prior to the merger 
with Daimler Benz) each have 28.3 per cent, 21.1 per cent, and 12.9 per cent of the U.S. 
market for motor vehicles. Together, the largest three domestic automakers in the United 
States have 62.3 per cent of the U.S. market. Imports account for approximately 15 per 
cent of the United States market and do not include locally-made Japanese brands, Morris 
(2001).  
  In general, the European market is more fragmented than the North American 
market. In 2002, Renault had 11.3 per cent of the European market for passenger cars and 
light commercial vehicles. Volkswagen and Opel (a GM subsidiary) followed with 10 per 
cent and 9 per cent of this market respectively. The five largest European brands, 
Renault, Volkswagen, Peugeot, Fiat and Citroen, accounted for 43.6 per cent of the 
European market. Ford, the fourth largest competitor in Europe, had 8.9 per cent of the 
market. Japanese and South Korean firms accounted for approximately 12.2 per cent and 
3.1 per cent respectively.  
  The Japanese market is the most consolidated of all triad markets. Toyota alone 
has 38.3 per cent of the automobile market, Henderson (2003). Honda, the second largest 
Japanese automaker, accounts for 15.6 per cent. Together, Honda, Toyota, Renault-
Nissan and Suzuki-Maruti, the four largest Japanese automakers, have 78.4 per cent of 
the Japanese market. Ford, which acquired domestic Mazda, accounts for 5 per cent. 
General Motors, the U.S. leader and the world’s largest car manufacturer, has a mere 0.4 
per cent of this market. VW, the European leader, has 1.2 per cent. Imports are a mere 4.5 
per cent of the Japanese market and include imports by Japanese companies 
manufacturing abroad.    6
  Excluding Japan, Toyota is the market leader in two of the six largest countries in 
Asia-Pacific: Malaysia and Thailand. South Korea is dominated by Hyundai, which 
controls 72.9 per cent of that market. Suzuki-Maruti is the leader in India, with 36.8 per 
cent market share. Indeed, only Australia and China have Western-based market leaders. 
In Australia, GM controls 22 per cent of the market, followed closely by Japan, which 
holds 20.6 per cent of the market. Including Japan, the top six Asian automakers control 
69.5 per cent of the Asian market. This includes Renault-Nissan (8.1 per cent) and Ford-
Mazda (4.4 per cent), Japanese companies in which Western firms have a dominant 
share, Henderson (2003). 
  Although the majority of the market in each of the three triad regions is controlled 
by home-region oriented companies, foreign companies continue to play a major role in 
each region. For example, Ford holds 10.9 per cent of the European market and is the 
fourth largest competitor. A number of foreign companies attained a competitive position 
by acquiring the operations of a local producer, such as GM’s Opel subsidiary and others, 
through organic growth in foreign markets, such as Toyota and Honda in North America. 
  These findings counter a number of popular myths about the ‘archetypal global 
industry’, many dating from the 1980s and early 1990s which saw the global expansion 
of Japanese firms in the industry. Common views included: that a global car and a global 
car firm would soon evolve; that all production would shift to cheap labour regions 
leaving ‘hollow corporations’ in the United States and Europe, Jonas (1986), and; that 
sales by incumbents in the largest markets would be overtaken by more competitive 
foreign rivals. Both solid research, such as Womack, Jones and Roos (1991) and more 
sensationalist books, Maynard (2003) supported these views each of which had 
significant strategic implications for management in the automotive business. We find   7
that such global car industry predictions have not come to pass for the key reason that the 
industry operates regionally, not globally.  
 
Barriers to Global Expansion in the Automotive Industry 
The auto industry operates largely in “clusters” of localized activity within each major 
triad region, as discussed in Rugman and D’Cruz (2000). There are networks of key 
supplies, other suppliers, key distributors, other partners, and the OEMs assemble cars 
from imports of literally thousands of suppliers, all location bound. This is why of the 55 
million vehicles produced each year over 90 per cent are sold where they are made, 
McKinsey Quarterly (2003). 
Auto firms are also strongly embedded in a range of other downstream activities 
and after-sales markets including financing (such as Ford Credit), insurance, maintenance 
and repairs (like Ford’s Kwik-Fit operations), parts and accessories and emergency 
rescue services (such Ford’s Rescu). These represent a substantial proportion of total 
revenues for the larger firms and are highly regionally-specific, Ealey and Troyano-
Bermudez (2003). 
  Another persistent barrier to a global strategy or a global car is cultural barriers 
across regions. European consumers prefer performance cars with good engines while in 
the United States large comfortable cars are the norm. Even within NAFTA, while the 
United States and Canada prefer automatic transmissions, most cars in Mexico have 
manual transmissions. In terms of customer tastes, it is impossible to market the same car 
across regions, and usually all of the economies of scale for a model are achieved within 
each major region, Hong, Roos and Wensley (2004), Grein (2001). 
  Another factor is fuel. Diesel continues to be popular in Europe but is being 
phased out in the United States because of its environmental implications. Rather than   8
phase out the less expensive fuel, European automakers are seeking ways of making it a 
cleaner alternative.  
  Each regional market in which automakers operate has its own set of 
environmental regulations. In the United States, automakers must design its vehicles to 
conform to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) regulations and the 
environmental regulations of individual states. Other regulations that relate to automotive 
design include: noise control and fuel economy. The companies’ industrial processes are 
also heavily regulated with laws relating to water discharges, air emissions, waste 
management and environmental cleanup. European and Asia-Pacific markets have 
different environmental laws to which automaker’s operations must comply. For instance, 
the European Union is making all carmakers financially responsible for dismantling and 
recycling its own vehicles.  
Finally, tariffs, ranging from 2.5 per cent in the United States, 10 per cent in some 
European countries and 100 per cent in some developing countries, represent another 
significant barrier to globalization.  
Each region has a particular regulatory and competitive environment in which the 
major world players compete for market share. Local competitors are more adept at 
meeting the demands of their regional markets because they possess know-how on 
consumer preferences, government regulations, and market trends. While foreign 
companies might hire local personnel, purchase local car manufacturers, and do extensive 
market research, companies headquartered in that region are more capable of responding 
to changing circumstances of their primary market.  
 
Cases   9
We now discuss seven cases with their top 500 ranking in parenthesis:- General Motors 
(3), Volkswagen (21), Toyota (10), DaimlerChrysler (7), Honda (4), Ford (5) and Renault 
(125) 
General Motors  
The world’s largest manufacturer of automobiles is General Motors (GM). In 2002, the 
company’s revenues totaled $187 billion; GM accounted for nearly 15 per cent of the 
world’s market for trucks and automobiles. General Motors produces and manufactures 
vehicles in all three triad markets. Nonetheless, 74.3 per cent of its sales originate in the 
United States, its home national market. Including Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and 
Caribbean markets in North America, this number rises to 82.3 per cent of total sales. On 
the production side, its network of North American factories—which exist partly as a 
result of NAFTA—accounts for 65.8 per cent of production capacity. An international 
company yes, but by no means a global company, see Table 4. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
  General Motors is primarily an automotive company, but it also operates 
communications services businesses and has a financing and insurance arm. Its 
automotive business is segmented geographically: GM North America, GM Europe, GM 
Latin America/Africa/Mid-East, and GM Asia Pacific. Each of these regions has a set of 
brands it promotes. In North America, for example, these are Chevrolet, Pontiac, Saturn, 
etc. In Europe, GM’s brands include Opel, Vauxhall and Holden, among others. The GM 
Daewoo and Suzuki brands are marketed throughout Asia-Pacific.  
  The company is most successful in the North American market, where it holds 28 
per cent of the market compared to 8.7 per cent of the European market and 3.4 per cent   10
of the Asia-Pacific market. In North America, GM has a competitive advantage in that it 
is already well situated in the market and has a loyal consumer base. In other regions, 
however, it faces competition from local automakers that know their home regions very 
well. In Europe, Volkswagen, BMW, and DaimlerChrysler build high performance cars. 
In Asia, competitors build smaller, more fuel efficient cars that cater to local preferences. 
  General Motors’ primary market is North America, in particular the United States. 
It derives most of its revenue and most of its profits from its home-region operations. 
GM’s strategy must balance the benefit of investing in foreign regions to the benefits of 
investing in its home-region market. Foreign markets, though potentially profitable, do 
not offer the consolidated GM company sufficient incentive to switch the focus of its 
strategy. GM has plans to expand in China, but this is a country where rival MNEs are 
already active and where local Chinese producers are adapt at appropriating the 
intellectual property of western firms. In other words, China offers potentially high 
returns, but has great risks. 
  
Volkswagen  
In March 1998, Germany’s Volkswagen revamped its strategy in the U.S. market 
by introducing the New Beetle. The car’s appeal stems from the 60s and 70s nostalgia for 
the original VW Beetle. In 2002, Volkswagen delivered over 420,000 vehicles to the 
United States market and accounted for approximately 10.1 per cent of the passenger car 
import market.  
Although the Volkswagen comeback into the U.S. market has been a success, the 
North American market is still a minor part of the company’s operations. In 2002, only 
19.9 per cent of total revenues originated in North America. It is the European market 
that Volkswagen depends on for the vast majority of its revenue. Like GM, which   11
concentrates in the U.S. market, VW’s primary market is Europe. Its cars reflect the 
European taste for performance, safety and durability. Germany accounted for 27.5 per 
cent of total sales. Including other European countries, the intra-regional sales of VW rise 
to 69.3 per cent. In addition, Europe accounts for over three-fourths of all assets. This is a 
highly regional company, and while success in other regions is significant, the company’s 
main strategic market continues to be its home region, see Table 5. 
Table 5 here 
Over the last few years, Volkswagen has increasingly relied on foreign markets 
for its revenue and production. Between 1993 and 2002, production outside of Germany 
rose from 53.3 per cent of all units to 64.5 per cent, and its foreign workforce rose from 
40.7 per cent to 48.1 per cent of the total. However, many of these factories and workers 
are located in Eastern Europe. Similarly, unit sales in foreign markets increased from 
69.1 per cent to 81.8 per cent, but a large portion of these units are actually sold in the 
European regional market. Units delivered to Europe accounted for 63.2 per cent of total 
deliveries in 2002.  
Volkswagen also has a larger share of the passenger car market in its home region. 
The company holds 30 per cent of its domestic market and 17.9 per cent of the European 
market (including Germany). This is well above its market share in the other two triad 
regions. Although the company has had some success in developing countries, with 25.1 
per cent of the Mexican market and 20.2 per cent of the South American market, its 
revenues from these regions account for a very small fraction of total revenues because of 
the small size of these economies and their automobile markets.  
 
Toyota   12
In 2002, two regional markets accounted for well over 80 per cent of Toyota’s revenues: 
Asia (with Japan at 45 per cent of revenues) and North America, at 38.8 per cent of 
revenues. Europe was only at 8.8 per cent of revenues. In terms of units sold, the 
geographic distribution is similar: Asia and Oceania account for 46.2 per cent of unit 
sales (Japan at 38 per cent); North America for 30.8 per cent; and Europe for 15 per cent. 
Thus, in terms of revenue and units sold, Toyota is a bi-regional company. Market share 
shows a slightly different picture. Toyota holds approximately 40 per cent of the Japanese 
market but only 10 per cent of the North American market. Moreover, production is not 
as dispersed around the world; 75.9 per cent of all Toyota cars are still produced in Japan. 
Only 14.9 per cent are produced in North America. Other regions account for less than 10 
per cent of production.  
Table 6 here 
  Over the last 10 years, Toyota’s intra-regional percentage of sales has decreased 
from 57.1 per cent to 46.2 per cent. One major reason for this is the Japanese market 
itself, where sales decreased from 48.4 per cent of total revenues in 1993 to 38.3 per cent 
in 2002. In contrast, North America, European, and non-triad sales have steadily 
increased in importance. In 1993, Toyota derived 25.4 per cent of its sales from North 
America. This rose to 30.8 per cent in 2002; EU restrictions on imports of Japanese cars 
were one reason why Toyota historically has been unable to be successful in the 
European market. European sales accounted for a mere 9.9 per cent of total sales in 1993, 
but by 2002 Toyota almost doubled the number of units sold so that, in this year, the 
region accounted for 15 per cent of total sales. This is partly a result of more local 
production but also of Toyota learning to cater to the European market.  
Table 7   13
  The Asian economies have been in a slump since the 1990s, and Europe has been 
growing slowly. This is why the North American market is very important for all 
Japanese manufacturers. Japanese carmakers began to manufacture in the United States, 
the largest North American national market, in the 1980s to protect themselves from 
import restrictions. North America is Toyota’s second largest regional market in terms of 
revenues. It is also highly profitable. In 2002, one-fourth of Toyota’s profits originated in 
this region.  
Toyota manufactures locally over two-thirds of the cars it sells in the United 
States. The company’s Canadian plant also serves this regional market, and a Mexican 
plant in Tijuana is expected to increase local production when it opens in 2005. Local 
responsiveness is important. Toyota introduced its luxury models to accommodate the 
aging and wealthier North American baby boomers in the 1990s. Today, the company is 
introducing cars to target the young American customer, the demographic echo of the 
baby boomers. Sixty per cent of U.S. car buyers remain loyal to the brand of their first 
car. It is thus imperative to service this young market.  
   American consumers, for their part, have been responsive to the company’s 
reputation for quality and in particular for the lower price at which Toyota’s cars are sold. 
In fact, during economic downturns in which consumers seek more value for their money 
Toyota does better in the United States. The company’s cars are not only less expensive, 
but they also consume less gasoline than American cars. The resale value is also higher 
for Toyota cars. One major advantage for Toyota is that it has some of the best 
manufacturing facilities in the world, and it combines this with excellent relationships 
with its suppliers. The company is so efficient that, despite the lower price of its cars, it 
makes an average profit of $1,000 on each car sold compared to $330 for GM.    14
  Toyota’s European operations are money losers, but the company continues to try 
to access this market and increase its market share from its 3.8 per cent level in 2002. To 
boost its image for performance in the region, the company recently began to compete in 
Formula One races. To protect itself from currency risk, Toyota will now produce a 
higher percentage of its cars within the region. That also means more local procurement. 
To this end, Porsche was asked to produce engines for its European models. Porsche 
already produces transmissions for the company. The company expects to increase its 
market share to 5 per cent by 2005.  
 Toyota is one of the most efficient companies at outsourcing production to 
suppliers with whom it enjoys amicable long-term, sometimes kieretsu-style 
relationships. If the auto industry is to become more like the electronics industry (as 
many believe may occur), vehicle brand owners (VBOs), such as Toyota, GM, VW, will 
be the equivalent of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electronics 
industry, such as Nokia, IBM, and Microsoft, and will concentrate on designing, 
engineering and marketing vehicles to be sold under their brand while others take care of 




When German Daimler-Benz merged with U.S. Chrysler, the aim of the German 
company was to secure a share in the large U.S. economy-class car market. Synergies 
(for instance in the area of purchasing), it argued, would reduce costs across all 
operations. At first glance, one can argue that the merger achieved its goal. In 2002, 58.7 
per cent of the company’s revenues originated in North America, a trend that has 
remained relatively stable since 2000, see Table 8. These data define the firm as host-  15
region oriented. The numbers can be deceiving though; soon after the merger the 
Chrysler group was plagued by management defections and decreasing profits.  
Table 8 here  
  Two things help explain the troubles of this merger. The first is that these 
companies were producing very different products. Mercedes Benz, Daimler-Benz’ 
brand, had a competitive edge in the luxury market. Chrysler produced popular cars for 
the U.S. market. Although the expensive parts of Daimler’s vehicles could be used for 
more affordable Chrysler cars and the cheaper Chrysler parts be used on Daimler 
vehicles; both these moves were likely to reduce the competitive advantage on each of 
the markets in which the original companies operated. Chrysler cars could have become 
less affordable while Daimler’s brand might have lost its reputation for quality. In effect, 
while some parts can be shared and suppliers can manufacture different products for both 
vehicle brands at lower prices, the benefits from the merger were limited by the different 
product lines of each company.  
  The second, and perhaps most important barrier to overcome, was the cross-
cultural differences between the German and U.S. companies. From the beginning, 
Daimler’s management dominated the merged company, which resulted in an outflow of 
key U.S. personnel from management positions and the designer ranks. The Germans 
tended to be bureaucratic while U.S. managers made decisions on the spot. Many U.S. 
managers left unable to deal with the imposed management style. Capable designers went 
to rivals General Motors and Ford. Over time, the company has improved its cultural 
management of the U.S. operations, and this is improving the company’s overall position 
in the motor vehicle market.    16
 DaimlerChrysler  is  undoubtedly a host-region based company, but a closer look at 
the organization shows, not a cohesive organization with a bi-regional market span, but 
two internal groups with individual global standings.. The Mercedes Car Group, the non-
commercial vehicle successor to the German part of the merger, derives 63 per cent of its 
revenues from the European market. The Chrysler Group, on the other hand, continues to 
derive over 90 per cent of its revenues from the North American market.  
  In terms of production, the Mercedes Group has eight production locations in 
Europe while the Chrysler Group has none. In the NAFTA region, the Chrysler Group 
has 38 production locations while the Mercedes Group only has one. This reflects two 
separate entities each trying to capitalize on their own knowledge of its home region, not 
a truly bi-regional or host-region oriented company.  
Honda 
 
Toyota may be the largest Japanese automaker in the world, but in the United States, 
Honda competes successfully for market share. In 2002, the Honda Accord was the best-
selling passenger car in the United States. Not surprisingly, given the size of the US 
market, the company generates over half its revenues (55.6 per cent) in North America. 
Its home market of Japan accounts for only 23.3 per cent of sales. European sales account 
for 11.2 per cent of sales while sales to non-triad regions account for the remaining 9.9 
per cent. Most of the company’s assets are also in its host region of North America, 53 
per cent. See Table 9. 
Table 9 here 
  This unusual dependence on the North American market is partly the result of 
Honda’s very early market-entry into the United States in the 1950s, as well as Toyota’s 
evolving dominance of the Japanese market. The relative spread of revenues across the   17
triad is not only influenced by the ability of a company to penetrate a foreign market, but 
also by how much of the domestic market it can attain. A small car manufacturer might 
have better opportunities for growth, despite the liability of foreignness, in another region 
of the triad than in its own home region. Indeed, Toyota’s share of the U.S. market is 
higher than Honda’s, but the region is significantly more important to Honda’s overall 
revenues than to Toyota’s.  
  Honda’s future success is expected to rely on the company’s three strategic 
directions: to create value, “glocalization” a term the company coined to mean localized 
global operations and a commitment to the future. To increase value, the company relies 
on continued innovation. Honda’s modular production methods are giving it an edge 
against the competition. Around the world the company is known for its smaller, less 
expensive, more efficient and environmentally friendly cars.  
Glocalization is the company’s commitment to a global supply chain that is 
responsive to local customers. “Made by Global Honda” has already been chosen as the 
expression that will represent this global supply network that will link facilities in 
different regions. Honda divides its business into five regional operations: its domestic 
market of Japan; North America, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa; and 
Asia and Oceania. The Japanese market is expected to be served through imports from 
China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. To maintain its local responsiveness, the 
company has R&D facilities in each of the triad markets.  
 
Ford and the Premier Auto Group (PAG) 
Before it bought into Mazda and took over the four European auto manufacturers that 
make up its Premier Brands Group (PAG) Ford had already developed a relatively strong 
presence in Europe. In contrast to General Motor’s mode of internationalization through   18
M&A it had expanded organically through the development of local sales, distribution 
and manufacturing activities around the world. In Europe it began with a plant in 
Manchester, England in 1911 before moving to the Dagenham site near London in 1932. 
Three-quarters of Ford’s overseas production is now located in Europe, with plants in 
Germany, Spain, the UK and Belgium, Dicken (2003). Yet, including Brazil around 50 
per cent of total production still takes place in the Americas, primarily in the U.S., 
Mexico and Canada. 
This distribution reflects the regional sales mix of Ford’s core brand, listed in 
Table 10, with 62  per cent sales in North America, 29  per cent in Europe and a weak 5  
per cent showing in the Asia-Pacific region. Ford’s historically weak position in Asia 
spurred it to establish an alliance with Mazda. This began with a series of joint ventures 
leading to Ford’s initial 25  per cent stake in Mazda in 1979 increased to 33.4  per cent in 
1996. The alliance has probably succeeded in boosting Mazda’s sales in the U.S market, 
more than Ford’s showing in Japan and Asia. 
 
Table 10 here 
 
The series of alliances and takeovers that led to the creation of the PAG were 
driven partly by the considerable drop in Ford’s market share in Europe from 1994 to 
1999, from almost 12 per cent to just over 9  per cent. A broad range of restructurings at 
the end of the 1990s and earlier this decade were initiated by then CEO Jacques Nasser 
who stepped in to refocus on the central Ford brand operations and marketing. In 1999, 
Ford bought Volvo for $6.45 billion, the largest of the PAG companies, adding to Jaguar 
(bought in 1989), Aston Martin and Land Rover.   19
On the face of it the overall Ford Group, combining the core brands group and the 
European-centered PAG, appears to be one of the more global of the largest auto firms. It 
is, however, still heavily regional and primarily U.S.-oriented. The relative lack of 
integration between the group companies, particularly when compared to the more recent 
Renault-Nissan alliance described below, further underlines its regional structure. 
Although Volvo, the largest of the four PAG firms, is listed as a ‘Center of Excellence for 
Safety’ within the Ford Group and a ‘Center of Excellence for Telematics’ within the 
PAG, this simply means its research and product development in these areas are 
monitored by other group companies. Volvo is headquartered in Gothenburg. Its major 
plants are in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands (operated by Nedcar), where it made 
398,631 vehicles in 2002 (plus assembly units in South Africa, Thailand and Malaysia). It 
has a Swedish President and CEO and a very Swedish/North European organizational 
structure and culture.  
The need to clearly differentiate and segment the individual brands is one major 
factor underlying the structural separation and cultural distinctiveness of the group 
companies in Ford. As discussed above, customizing auto designs and marketing 
campaigns to regional and even national markets is still a central part of the business. 
 
Renault and Nissan 
The Renault-Nissan alliance, currently heralded as one of the most successful in the 
business, represents the combination of two very different organizations, structurally and 
culturally. Renault is a strongly home-region oriented firm and is heavily dependent on 
its home economy, France. Alone it is relatively small holding just 4.2 per cent of the 
global market, but it vies with Volkswagen for European market leadership and held 10.7 
of this market in 2002. Nissan is one of the unusual bi-regional auto firms, with strong   20
sales in the United States and a relatively good market position in countries outside the 
triad regions. 
Together Renault and Nissan account for 9.1 per cent of global auto sales, placing 
them jointly amongst the top 5 companies. Table 11 shows the individual and combined 
sales of both firms. These are similar-sized firms with very different geographic 
footprints that complement each other well.  
 
Table 11 here 
A similar pattern of differentiation is true for production. Nissan manufactures 
just over half of its vehicles in Japan with most of the rest spread fairly evenly between 
the United States, Mexico and the UK. It has industrial operations in 19 countries, 
including manufacturing sites in Taiwan, South Africa, Thailand, Philippines and 
Indonesia. Renault manufactures in 17 countries but makes over 55 per cent of its 
vehicles in France and most of the rest in Europe.  
The alliance began in March 1999 with Renault taking a 36.8 per cent stake in 
Nissan; this is now increased to 44.4 per cent with Nissan having a reciprocal 15 per cent 
stake in Renault. The alliance has deepened following the far-reaching changes put in 
place by Carlos Ghosn, installed as President and CEO of Nissan and now revered for 
having engineered a radical turnaround in the firm’s fortunes. It is now much broader and 
deeper than the auto sector alliances described above. Driven by an alliance board, 
chaired by the CEO of Renault, the two firms have developed: shared production 
facilities in Mexico, Brazil and Spain; common engineering platforms for entry-level B 
segment and mid-level C segment vehicles; common power train parts and increased   21
sharing of engines and transmissions, and; increasingly integrated IT, information and 
communications systems. 
Renault’s competencies in marketing, design and financing complement Nissan’s 
capabilities in engineering and manufacturing processes. Synergies are enhanced through 
the exchange of personnel. About 50 employees from Renault have joined departments 
such as supplier relations, product strategy, sales and marketing, and finance in Nissan. 
Similarly, around 50 Nissan employees work in the areas of quality control, vehicle 
engineering, manufacturing and power train in Renault. Beyond this, 250 executives from 
both firms are assigned to the permanent alliance structures, including cross-company 
teams and functional task teams and a further 250 Nissan employees are part of the 
restructured European sales and marketing divisions of Renault. 
Nissan is one of the 8 passenger-car companies that have manufacturing 
operations in the centre-north maquiladoras region of Mexico, alongside GM, Ford, 
Chrysler and VW. Because Nissan had established these plants prior to the finalization of 
NAFTA they are considered to be within the agreement, with the right to privileged 
access to the export markets of the United States and Canada. Renault is therefore now in 






The world's automobile sector has no companies producing globally. Instead, most 
production occurs in sub-regional clusters within the broad triad economies of the EU, 
North America, and Asia. GM is a very home-region oriented firm, as is VW. 
DaimlerChrysler is a host-oriented regional firm. Only Toyota and Honda are "bi-  22
regionals", able to create significant sales presence in the host region United States, as 
well as in their home-region market of Japan and Asia. There is no evidence of a global 
car; just regional production as well as intra-regional sales. It's a regional world, not a 
global one.   23
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Table 1: The Top 500 MNEs, 
 
Industry Category No of Firms in the Fortune 500 No. of Firms in the RNGMA  % of total
Manufacturing 206 180 87.4             
1 Aerospace and Defense 11 11 100.0           
2 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 19 18 94.7             
3 Computer, Office & Electronics 39 36 92.3             
4 Construction, Building Materials and Glass 12 11 91.7             
5 Energy, Petroleum & Refining 43 31 72.1             
6 Food, Drug & Tobacco 18 14 77.8             
7 Motor Vehicle and Parts 31 29 93.5             
8 Other Manufacturing  13 13 100.0           
9 Natural Resource Manufacturing 20 17 85.0             
Services 294 200 68.0             
1 Banks 62 40 64.5             
2 Entertainment, Printing & Publishing 9 9 100.0           
3 Merchandisers 77 63 81.8             
4 Other Financial Services 58 27 46.6             
5 Other Services 25 21 84.0             
6 Telecommunications & Utilities 43 27 62.8             
7 Transportation Services 20 13 65.0             
Total 500 380 76.0             
 
 
Data are for 2001 and are re-calculated from the annual reports of the world's top 500 firms.  
Source: The Regional Nature of Global Multinational Activity, 2003. Indiana University CIBER, 
http://www.kelley.indiana.edu/CIBER 
   27











General Motors 8 29.8
Mitsubishi 64 28.5
DaimlerChrysler 35 22.1
*  Rank in the WIR list of the 100 largest non-financial transnational corporations  
   in terms of size of foreign assets
** The WIR's Transnationality Index (TNI) is calculated as the average of the 
   following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales 
   and foreign employment to total employment.
Source: UNCTAD's World Investment Report (WIR) 2003 (giving data for 2001).   
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Table 3: The Regional Nature of the Motor Vehicles & Parts Industries 
 
                      
                     North America     Europe     Asia-Pacific 
    500        Revenues    F/T    per cent intra    per cent of total     per cent of total     per cent of tota
    Rank   Company  Region   in bn US$    Sales   regional  sales    sales    sales 
                      
Bi-regional                 
1  10  Toyota Motor  Asia-Pacific         120.8        50.8          49.2               36.6                7.7               49.
2  58  Nissan Motor  Asia-Pacific           49.6        50.3          49.7               34.6              11.0               49.
3  285  Bridgestone  Asia-Pacific           17.6        61.2          38.8               43.0    l            10.1               38.
4  342  Michelin  Europe           14.6    na          47.0               40.0              47.0      n
                    
Host-region oriented               
1  7  DaimlerChrysler  Europe         136.9    na          29.9               60.1              29.9      n
2  41  Honda Motor  Asia-Pacific           58.9        73.1          26.9               53.9                8.1               26.
                      
Home-region oriented               
1  3  General Motors  North America         177.3        25.5          81.1               81.1              14.6      n
2  5  Ford Motor  North America         162.4        33.3          66.7               66.7    z            21.9      n
3  21  Volkswagen  Europe           79.3        72.3          68.2               20.1              68.2                5.
4  49  Fiat  Europe           51.9        65.6          73.3               13.0              73.3      n
5  112  BMW  Europe           34.4        73.4          57.3               31.7    l            57.3      n
6  125  Renault  Europe           32.6        60.8          89.1    na              89.1      n
7  133  Hyundai Motor  Asia-Pacific           30.9        20.9          81.6               18.1                0.3               81.
8  166  Delphi  North America           26.1    na          77.7               77.7              18.4      n
9  171  Mitsubishi Motors  Asia-Pacific           25.6        40.9          62.8               22.1              12.1               62.
10  252  Denso  Asia-Pacific           19.2        32.4          73.1               20.0    l              6.8               73.
11  264  Johnson Controls  North America           18.4    na          62.9               62.9              25.6      n
12  267  Volvo  Europe           18.3    na          51.6               30.2              51.6                6.
13  278  Visteon  North America           17.8        29.0          71.0               71.0    z            15.6      n
14  296  Mazda Motor  Asia-Pacific           16.8        34.3          65.7               24.4                7.0               65.
15  306  TRW  North America           16.4        40.7          59.3               59.3    z    na      n
16  343  Man Group  Europe           14.6        72.6          68.7               15.6              68.7               12.
17  352  Goodyear Tire & Rubber (q)  North America           14.1        45.9          54.1               54.1    z    na      n
18  369  Lear  North America           13.6        51.4          58.2               58.2              31.6      n
19  381  Suzuki Motor  Asia-Pacific           13.3        31.6          68.4               13.3              14.9               68.
20  404  Isuzu Motors  Asia           12.8        30.8          69.2               39.6      na               69.
21  456  Magna International  North America           11.0        67.2          67.7               67.7              31.4      n
22  462  Fuji Heavy Industries  Asia           10.9        34.0          66.0               33.7      na               66.
23  484  Dana  North America           10.5   na         74.8               74.8              17.4                3.
                      
Weighted Average*             42.3            60.6         
Total           1,226.5              
                                   
        
Notes: Data are for 2001; q. Goodyear Tire & Rubber: Based on the location of the selling subsidiary (i.e. exports are not included). z. 
U.S. only; l. Americas; j. refers to Japan only. * Weighted intra-regional sales average is weighted according to revenues. 
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Table 4: Regional Sales of General Motors 
Country Sales units Sales units  Sales $  Assets  Production  Capacity
(000) (%) (%) (%) Capacity (%)
(000)
United States 4,859            57.0              74.3              70.9              4,839            51.3             
North America 5,623            66.0              82.3              80.5              6,213            65.8             
Other Americas 635               7.4                2.5                1.5                794               8.4               
Total Americas 6,258            73.4              84.8              82.0              7,007            74.2             
Europe 1,662            19.5              14.2              14.7              2,123            22.5             
Asia-Pacific 605               7.1                na na 311               3.3               
Other na na 1.0                3.3                na na
Total 8,525            100.0            100.0            100.0            9,441            100.0           
Source: Adapted from General Motors, Annual Report, 2002  
            Note: Data are for 2002 
 
 
Table 5: Regional Sales of Volkswagen 
 
Country Delivered Delivered Sales $  Assets 
Units Units* (%) (%)
(000) (%)
Germany 940                      18.9                    27.5                 50.0               
Rest of Europe 2,210                   44.3                    41.8                 28.7               
Total Europe 3,150                   63.2                    69.3                 78.6               
North America 663                      13.3                    19.9                 16.4               
South America 421                      8.5                      3.8                   2.9                 
Africa na na 1.1                   0.3                 
Asia/Oceania 621                      12.5                    5.9                   1.8                 
Other 128.9                   2.6                      1.1                   0.3                 
Total 4,984                   100.0                  100.0               100.0              
Source: Adapted from Volkswagen, Annual Report, 2002
* Delivered Units include unsold inventory  




Table 6: Toyota’s Regional Sales, Assets, and Production 
 
Country Sales  units 
Sales units 
(%) 








                    
Japan             2,217                 38.3              45.0               52.8            4,029                 75.9 
Asia-Pacific             2,675                 46.2   NA   NA   NA    NA 
North America             1,780                 30.8              38.8               35.8               793                 14.9 
Europe                866                 15.0                8.8                 6.7               258                   4.9 
Other                463                   8.0                7.4                 4.7               225                   4.2 
            
Total             5,785               100.0            100.0             100.0            5,306               100.0 
                    
   
Note: Data are for 2002 
Source: Toyota, Annual Report, 2002 
Notes: Production per cent is calculated using units 
Unit Sales shows percentage of units sold in each region 
Sales $ shows percentage of revenues generated in each region 
Asia-Pacific includes Japan   
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Table 7: Toyota is Regional, Sales 1993-2002 
 
Year Total  Japan Asia-Pacific 
North 
America Europe  Other 
   units sold 
1993      4,466,218        2,159,474      2,548,736       1,134,006         442,291           341,185  
1994      4,130,846        2,010,130      2,372,598       1,105,447         384,249           268,552  
1995      3,260,670        1,560,970      1,857,920          911,578         288,065           203,107  
1996      4,148,641        2,058,457      2,422,167       1,117,248         360,003           249,223  
1997      4,559,515        2,216,072      2,659,759       1,201,309         415,580           282,867  
1998      4,456,344        1,907,059      2,300,369       1,293,121         500,668           362,186  
1999      4,695,147        1,929,279      2,244,982       1,485,095         557,506           407,564  
2000      5,182,774        2,177,524      2,517,465       1,689,483         633,879           341,947  
2001      5,526,863        2,322,838      2,726,131       1,733,569         691,135           376,028  
2002      5,784,917        2,217,002      2,675,493       1,780,133         866,351           462,940  
            
   % of units sold  
1993             100.0                 48.4               57.1                25.4                 9.9                   7.6  
1994             100.0                 48.7               57.4                26.8                 9.3                   6.5  
1995             100.0                 47.9               57.0                28.0                 8.8                   6.2  
1996             100.0                 49.6               58.4                26.9                 8.7                   6.0  
1997             100.0                 48.6               58.3                26.3                 9.1                   6.2  
1998             100.0                 42.8               51.6                29.0               11.2                   8.1  
1999             100.0                 41.1               47.8                31.6               11.9                   8.7  
2000             100.0                 42.0               48.6                32.6               12.2                   6.6  
2001             100.0                 42.0               49.3                31.4               12.5                   6.8  
2002             100.0                 38.3               46.2                30.8               15.0                   8.0  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Toyota, Annual Report, 2002 
Note: 1995 is calculated using 9 months instead of 12.   32
 
Table 8: Daimler Chrysler Revenues 
Country/Region 2002 2001 2000
(in percentages of total)
European Union 31.1              29.9             31.0                 
of which Germany 15.5              15.9             16.0                 
North America 58.7              60.1             59.1                 
of which United States 51.9              53.1             52.0                 
Other markets  10.2              10.0             9.9                   
Total Revenues 100.0            100.0           100.0               
Source: DaimlerChrysler, Key Figures, 2002  
 
 
Table 9: Regional Sales and Assets of Honda 
 
Country 
Sales $ ( per 
cent) 
Assets ( per 
cent) 
        
Japan                    23.3                     31.4  
North America                    55.6                     53.0  
Europe                    11.2                       7.4  
Other                      9.9                       8.2  
    
Total                  100.0                   100.0  
        
Source: Adapted from Honda, Annual Report, 2003 
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Table 10: Ford and its Brands (2002)
AUTOMOTIVE CORE BRANDS 
Primary
Brands
Dealers 13,000 1,561 2,141 6,131
Markets 137 38 15 145
Competitors DaimlerChrysler, DaimlerChrysler, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Nissan,
Fiat, GM, GM, GM, Honda, Mitsubishi,
Honda, Nissan, Honda, Nissan, Honda, Nissan, GM,
Toyota, VW, Toyota, BMW Toyota, VW DaimlerChrysler,
Hyundai/Kia VW
Vehicle 
retail sales 5,457,445 159,651 274,875 964,800
...% of total  74% 2% 4% 13%
Sales mix 62% N.America 98% N.America 98% N.America 39% Asia-Pacific
29% Europe 2% Rest-of-World 2% Rest-of-World 36% N.America
5% Asia-Pacific 20% Europe
3% S.America 5% Rest-of-World
1% Rest-of-World
PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP (PAG)
Primary
Brands
Dealers 100 787 2,500 1,808
Markets 25 66 100 142
Competitors Lamborghini, DaimlerChrysler BMW, Mercedes- Toyota, Nissan,




retail sales 1,551 130,330 406,695 174,593
...% of total  0% 2% 5% 2%
Sales mix 30% N.America 50% N.America 60% Europe 61% Europe
30% Europe 41% Europe 30% N.America 25% N.America
30% UK 7% Asia-Pacific 10% Rest-of-World 14% Rest-of-World
10% Rest-of-World 2% Rest-of-World
Source: Corporate Annual Reports  34
Table 11: The Global Distribution of Renault and Nissan Sales (2002)
Region
France 763,612 32% 35,800 1% 799,412 16%
Germany 227,182 9% 64,269 2% 291,451 6%
UK 215,343 9% 106,583 4% 321,926 6%
Spain 202,186 8% 56,523 2% 258,709 5%
Italy 182,352 8% 59,616 2% 241,968 5%
Western Europe 1,869,251 78% 432,017 16% 2,301,268 45%
North America NA NA 804,186 29% 804,186 16%
Japan 2,414 0% 773,726 28% 776,140 15%
Other 532,310 22% 725,601 27% 1,257,911 24%
World Total 2,403,975 100% 2,735,530 100% 5,139,505 100%
Source: Corporate Annual Reports
Renault Nissan Combined Sales
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